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MARKET SHARE LIABILITY: A NEW METHOD
OF RECOVERY FOR D.E.S. LITIGANTS
In recent years, courts have encountered serious problems in applying
products liability law to fungible defective products.' While some plain-
tiffs injured by fungible products have identified the culpable manufactur-
ers and successfully litigated their claims,2 other injured parties have faced
serious threshold identification difficulties. The nature of fungible products
is such that litigants may be unable to identify the manufacturer who sup-
plied the injury-causing product. Unless this problem of identification is
overcome, the injured plaintiff is barred from presenting a valid cause of
action Consequently, traditional products liability law theories have of-
fered an inadequate basis for compensation to many plaintiffs injured by
defective fungible products.4
Litigation involving diethystilbestrol (DES) illustrates the current
problems in applying traditional products liability law to fungible defec-
tive products.5 Originally distributed in 1947 to prevent complications
during pregnancy, DES was later recognized as a cause of vaginal abnor-
1. "Fungible things are generally defined as interchangeable--capable of mutual sub-
stitution. They are of such kind or nature that one specimen or part may be used in place of
another specimen or equal part in the satisfaction of an obligation." Maritime Petroleum
Corp. v. Jersey City, I N.J. 287, 63 A.2d 262, 266 (1949).
2. See Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). In this case, the plaintiff sued 11 manufacturers of asbestos
insulation material allegedly used by him during his working career. Four of the manufac-
turers settled the claim before trial. A fifth manufacturer received a favorable directed ver-
dict by the trial court because the plaintiff had failed to show that he had ever been exposed
to any product of that company. Each of the remaining six manufacturers were found to
have been the cause-in-fact of some injury to the plaintiff and thus capable of being held
jointly and severally liable for total damages.
3. Identification of the defendant as the manufacturer or seller of the injury-causing
product is an essential element of a prima facie products liability case. Other indispensible
elements include proof of the defective and harmful nature of the injury-causing product,
and proximate causation. See I R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS
LIABILITY 2D, §§ 1:7, 1:28, 1:41 (1974).
4. The present theories for which a plaintiff may recover in a products liability case
include negligence, breach of warranty, strict liability, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and
a willful act. R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, supra note 3, at § 1:3.
5. Diethystilbestrol is a synthetic estrogen first developed in 1938 in England. It was
marketed with FDA approval in the United States for the treatment of complications during
pregnancy between 1941 and 1971. DES may be considered a fungible product because all
manufacturers of the drug were required to follow the same United States Pharmacopoeia
formula, see 21 U.S.C. § 351(b) (1976), and to use the same description of the drug on the
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malities in the daughters of women who took the drug. Many of these
daughters are now seeking to recover damages from drug manufacturers
for injuries sustained as a result of the maternal ingestion of DES during
pregnancy.6 These plaintiffs claim that the pharmaceutical companies
negligently manufactured and marketed DES without adequate testing;
however, most have been unable to identify the specific manufacturer of
the DES ingested by their mothers." As a result, plaintiffs have been
forced to proceed under one or more of three existing theories of liability
applied when the identity of the injury-causing defendant is uncertain: al-
ternative liability; concert of action; or industry-wide liability.
8
Courts, however, have generally been unwilling to apply these theories
to DES cases.9 Among the reasons given for finding these theories inappli-
cable to DES cases are the number of defendants involved in the suits, the
failure of all potential guilty parties to be joined as defendants, and the
unique characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry. As a result, most
plaintiffs have been left with no means of recovery under current products
labels when offered for sale, 21 U.S.C. § 352(e) (1976). See Comment, DES anda Proposed
Theory ofEnterprise Liability, 46 FORD. L. REV. 963 (1978).
6. The maternal ingestion of DES has been linked to a rare form of vaginal cancer
called adenocarcinoma and other abnormalities of the female reproductive tract. See notes
24-34 and accompanying text infra.
The injuries allegedly sustained by DES plaintiffs range from adenosis, to malignant tu-
mors, to death. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286 (1980); Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs, 170 N.J.
Super. 183, 406 A.2d 185 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 82 N.J. 267, 412 A.2d 774 (1979).
7. The long delay between the time of maternal ingestion of the drug and the time of
the discovery of abnormalities in the daughters and subsequent litigation is the prime cause
of the difficulties in identifying the manufacturers. During this period of time, physicians
have died, records have been lost, memories have faded, and pharmaceutical companies
have gone out of business. Furthermore, the fungible nature of DES allowed pharmacists to
substitute one brand of the drug for another. Kroll, Intra-Industry Joint Liability.- The Era of
Absolute Products Liability, 687 INs. L.J. 185, 187 (1980).
8. These theories have been developed and applied by the courts in various situations
in which requiring identification of the defendant responsible for the injury-causing instru-
mentality would have placed an undue burden on the plaintiff or would have been unjust
because of policy considerations. See notes 42-77 and accompanying text infra.
9. See Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337 (D. Neb. 1978). In that case, the plain-
tiff sued drug manufacturer Eli Lilly & Co. and the United States under the Federal Torts
Claim Act for its approval of the sale of DES. The court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment based on plaintiffs failure to present evidence that defendant had man-
ufactured the drug ingested by her mother. The court did not address the question of
whether any other theory of liability could be applied. The claim against the United States
was also dismissed. See also McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 150 Cal. Rptr.
730 (1978). The defendant's motion for summary judgment was affirmed in this case. The
court stated that the plaintiff failed to prove that all DES manufacturers misrepresented the
risks of the drug and thus could not maintain a cause of action based on the concert of
action theory.
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liability theories. 10
The California Supreme Court has recently proposed a solution to this
dilemma in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories." In this case, the plaintiffs
brought a class action 12 against eleven pharmaceutical companies, 13 seek-
ing damages for injuries sustained as a result of their mothers' consump-
tion of DES during pregnancy. Although the plaintiffs failed to identify
the specific manufacturers of the DES actually taken by their mothers,
they suggested that liability could be based on one of the three traditional
theories of liability.' 4 The court refused to apply any of these theories, but
it enunciated a new basis for liability upon which the action could be tried.
Basing its decision on a modification of the alternative liability theory, the
court held that the plaintiffs would be allowed to recover upon a showing
that the manufacturers, in the aggregate, produced a substantial percent-
age of the drug causing the plaintiffs' injuries. 5 Under the ruling, each
manufacturer would be liable for damages proportionate to its share of the
market unless the manufacturer could demonstrate that it did not produce
the drug which induced the plaintiffs' injuries. The court concluded that
under this approach, each manufacturer's liability would approximate the
damages caused by its product.'
6
The controversial theory of liability espoused in Sindell represents a
dramatic breakthrough for DES victims. Moreover, this theory of market
share liability could extend to cases which involve other fungible products
and an unidentifiable manufacturer. Under this theory, plaintiffs need
prove only that the defendants were manufacturers of the same defective
product which caused their injury and that the joined defendants represent
a substantial portion of the market for the product in question. Plaintiffs
10. Two state courts, however, have recently ruled in favor of DES plaintiffs. In Bichler
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (App. Div. 1981), the plaintiff recovered for injuries
sustained from the maternal ingestion of DES although she did not identify the specific
manufacturer of the drug. Similarly, in Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289
N.W.2d 20 (1979), the court allowed the plaintiff to proceed with her cause of action al-
though identification of the manufacturer was not made.
11. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286 (1980).
12. The plaintiff class, represented by Judith Sindell, consisted of women residing in
California whose mothers ingested DES during pregnancy and who may or may not have
been aware of the dangers to which they were exposed. Id at 593 n. 1, 607 P.2d at 925 n. 1,
163 Cal. Rptr. at 133 n.l.
13. The drug companies included Boyle Drug Company, Abbott Laboratories, Inc., Eli
Lilly & Co., Miles Laboratories, Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., Parke Davis & Co., Rexall
Drug Co., E.R. Squibb & Sons, Upjohn Co., and-Sandoz, Inc. Opening Brief for Appellant
at 3, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
14. 26 Cal. 3d at 598, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
15. Id at 610-13, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45.
16. Id at 613, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
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need not prove which individual defendant manufactured the specific in-
jury-causing product, nor must they rely on an expanded judicial interpre-
tation of the traditional theories of liability to support a valid cause of
action. Essentially, the Sindell court made a policy decision to forgo rigid
adherence to prior doctrines and instead to design a remedy which could
meet the needs of modern plaintiffs injured by fungible products like DES.
This Note will examine the various theories upon which DES plaintiffs
have advanced their claims prior to Sindell and will explain why these
theories have not provided plaintiffs with a recognized cause of action. It
will then examine the theory of market share liability enunciated in Sindell
and assess it in conjunction with the policy considerations underlying
products liability law. Finally, this Note will conclude that the theory of
market share liability is a novel yet well-founded approach to litigation
involving fungible defective products, consistent with the prior doctrine of
products liability law, and represents a necessary expansion of tort liability
in today's complex industrial society.
I. HISTORY OF DES
In 1947, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the distri-
bution of DES on an experimental basis' 7 for use in the prevention and
treatment of complications during pregnancy.' 8 This approval was based
on two studies attesting to the safety and effectiveness of DES in prevent-
ing pregnancy problems.' 9 Between 1947 and 1952, approximately eighty-
17. For a general analysis of the FDA approval system for new drugs see Merrill, Com-
pensation for Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L. REV. 1 (1973). The author states that:
[t]he drug approval system thus necessarily contemplates that drugs will be avail-
able for general use before all of their hazards are known. All consumers of pre-
scription drugs serve as guinea pigs for the pharmaceutical industry, for every new
drug remains basically "experimental" even after it has been approved for general
use.
Id. at 20-21 (footnote omitted).
18. DES was designed to prevent complications including imminent spontaneous abor-
tions, premature delivery, and various complications of pregnancy exacerbated by diabetes
or hypertension. See Smith, Diethylstilbestrol in the Prevention and Treatment of Complica-
dons of Pregnancy, 56 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 821 (1948).
19. See Smith, supra note 18; Karnaky, The Use of Stilbestrol for the Treatment of
Threatened and Habitual Abortion and Premature Labor- .4 Preliminary Report, 35 S. MED.
J. 838 (1942).
These two studies, conducted in the 1940's, concluded that DES could be used to prevent
progesterone deficiency during pregnancy and minimize resulting abnormalities including
abortion, miscarriage, and premature delivery. A total of 632 pregnancies were analyzed in
the Smith study, with 117 collaborating obstetricians in 16 states. The Karnaky study was
conducted on a much smaller basis and was centered in the Houston, Texas area.
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five companies manufactured DES.2" In 1952, the FDA declared that
DES was no longer a new drug21 and was considered safe for general use.
This declaration meant that any manufacturer could market the drug with-
out submitting additional data to the FDA concerning its safety and effec-
tiveness.22 By the end of that year, no fewer than 191 companies were
manufacturing and distributing DES.23
In 1971, two medical studies24 associated an increase in a rare form of
vaginal cancer called adenocarcinoma 25 with the maternal ingestion of
DES during pregnancy. Pursuant to these findings, the FDA required that
20. Petition for Hearing by Eli Lilly & Co. at 5-6, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26
Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Petition for Hear-
ing].
21. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321 (1976) provides:
(p)The term "new drug" means
1) Any drug (except a new animal drug or an animal feed bearing or containing
a new animal drug) the composition of which is such that such drug is not gener-
ally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to
evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe and effective for use under
the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof, ex-
cept that such a drug not so recognized shall not be deemed to be a "new drug" if
at any time prior to June 25, 1938, it was subject to the Food and Drugs Act of
June 30, 1906, as amended, and if at such time its labeling contained the same
representations concerning the conditions of its use; or
2) Any drug (except a new animal drug or an animal feed bearing or containing
a new animal drug) the composition of which is such that such drug, as a result of
investigations to determine its safety and effectiveness for use under such condi-
tions, has become so recognized, but which has not, otherwise than in such investi-
gations, been used to a material extent or for a material time under such
conditions.
22. Petition for Hearing, supra note 20, at 6. At the time defendants filed their new drug
applications, such applications became effective on the 60th day after filing if the Secretary
of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare did not disapprove the applica-
tion. The Secretary could disapprove an application if he found that the reports submitted
with the new drug application did not include adequate testing results or the method of
testing the safety of the drug or if the reports did not contain sufficient information on which
a decision could be made. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1976).
23. Petition for Hearing, supra note 20, at 6.
24. See Herbst, Ulfelder & Poskanzer, Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina, 284 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 878 (1971); Greenwald, Barlow, Nasca & Burnett, Vaginal Cancer after Maternal
Treatment with Synthetic Estrogens, 285 NEw ENG. J. MED. 390 (1971). These studies, upon
which the FDA relied, were conducted after an abnormally high number of women were
discovered to have contracted adenocarcinoma between 1966 and 1970. The studies noted
that these women were born during those years in which estrogen was commonly used in
high-risk pregnancies. In addition, it was found that all but one patient in the Herbst study
was exposed to estrogen in utero and that such exposure increased the risk of vaginal adeno-
carcinoma development in the child.
25. Adenocarcinoma is a rare form of vaginal cancer, the causes of which are unknown.
It may occur spontaneously in nature without exposure to DES before birth. Herbst, Cole,
Colton, Robboy & Scully, Age-Incidence and Risk of Diethylstilbestrol-Related Clear Cell
1981l
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pregnancy be listed by the manufacturers of DES as a contraindication26
to the use of the drug and that all other estrogens include a warning on
their labels concerning the association between DES and vaginal cancer.
27
Additional studies have since confirmed this association. 2' Although DES
is no longer used during pregnancy, it is still prescribed for treatment of
unusual menopausal symptoms and of certain kinds of cancer of the breast
and prostate.
2 9
It is estimated that between one-half million 3' and three million
3 1 wo-
men were exposed to DES between 1947 and 1971. A large number of
these women remain unaware of that exposure and of the potential com-
plications.32 Although only a small percentage of DES daughters have
contracted adenocarcinoma,33 the vast majority of the DES women suffer
from adenosis and must be constantly monitored by a physician.34
Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina and Cervix, 128 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 43
(1977).
26. Contraindication is an indication, symptom, or condition that makes a particular
treatment or procedure inadvisable. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
495 (1976).
27. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WEL-
FARE DRUG BULLETIN, Diethylstilbestrol Contraindicated in Pregnancy (Nov. 1971). In addi-
tion to the FDA requirement that DES manufacturers warn pregnant women about the
drug's dangers, the agency also initiated epidemiological studies to determine the validity of
the reported dangers.
28. See Ulfelder, The Stilbestrol-Adenosis-Carcinoma Syndrome, 38 CANCER 426 (July
Supp. 1976) (in utero exposure to stilbestrol was confirmed in two-thirds of the cases of
adenocarcinoma reported); Herbst, Cole, Norusis, Welch & Scully, Epidemiologic Aspects
and Factors Related to Survival in 384 Registry Cases of Clear Cell Adenocarcinoma of the
Vagina and Cervix, 135 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 876 (1979) (estimated that the
correlation between the use of the drug and adenocarcinoma ranged between .14 to 1.4 per
thousand daughters exposed to the drug); Nordqvist, Fidler, Woodruff & Lewis, Clear Cell
Adenocarcinoma of the Cervix and the Vagina, 37 CANCER 858 (1976) (adenocarcinoma can
occur spontaneously in nature and develop in women without maternal exposure to es-
trogen).
29. NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE & OFFICE OF CANCER COMM'N, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT DES EXPOSURE
BEFORE BIRTH, Pub. No. (NIH) 76-1118, at 2 [hereinafter cited as QUESTIONS AND AN-
SWERS).
30. Ulfelder, supra note 28, at 429.
31. Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1980, § 1 at 13, col. 1.
32. Appellant's Reply Brief at 3, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 149 Cal. Rptr. 138 (Ct.
App. 1978).
33. Herbst, supra note 28.
34. Adenosis is abnormal tissue present on the cervix or vagina. QUESTIONS AND AN-
SWERS, supra note 29, at 3. It is a precancerous condition which must be closely monitored
by a biopsy or coloscopy examination every six months. The treatment for adenosis is
cautherization, surgery, or cyrosurgery. 26 Cal. 3d at 594, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at
133.
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II. THEORIES OF LIABILITY PRIOR TO SINDELL
It is estimated that more than one thousand DES cases are presently
pending nationwide, with most of the major pharmaceutical companies
joined as defendants." Prior to the Sindell decision, few DES plaintiffs
had succeeded in presenting a valid cause of action against the drug com-
panies for injuries sustained from the maternal ingestion of the drug.36
Various procedural barriers such as the statute of limitations,37 failure to
obtain class action certification," in personam jurisdiction,39 and the non-
applicability of the successor-liability doctrine,4" resulted in early dismis-
sal of many cases. Some plaintiffs, including Ms. Sindell, have had
difficulty asserting a valid cause of action under one of the traditional the-
ories of liability because causation is difficult to establish when no specific
manufacturer of the injury-causing product can be identified.41 A review
of the theories of alternative liability, concert of action, and industry-wide
liability provides a foundation to determine whether the market share lia-
bility theory presented in Sindell is a consistent development in products
liability law.
A. Alternative Liability
The alternative liability theory is one which provides a plaintiff with a
means to hold more than one defendant liable when the specific source of
the injury is uncertain. Under this theory, a plaintiff who cannot identify
which one of multiple defendants caused an injury may shift the burden of
proof to the defendants to show that they were not responsible for the
35. Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1980, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
36. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
37. See, e.g., Diamond v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 366 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. App. 1979)
(plaintiff's cause of action barred by statute of limitations because it had not been brought
within 12 years of the date of the last delivery of the drug).
38. See, e.g., Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 76 11. App. 3d 753, 394 N.E.2d 1369 (1979)
(class action could not be maintained because individual determinations of proximate cause
would be required and would predominate over common questions of law and fact).
39. See, e.g., Rowell Laboratories, Inc. v. Superior Court, 117 Ariz. 400, 573 P.2d 91
(1977) (dismissed for lack of inpersonam jurisdiction, where defendant foreign drug manu-
facturing companies engaged in no systematic and continuous course of conduct within the
state).
40. See, e.g., Lemire v. Garrard Drugs, 95 Mich. App. 520, 291 N.W.2d 103 (1980)
(successor liability doctrine not applied since the defendant had no connection with the
plaintiff's mother nor knowledge of the alleged sale of DES to her 16 years prior to the
defendant's purchase of the drug store, and since they had no connection with the former
owner other than the purchase of his store).
41. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
19811
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plaintiff's injuries.42 The theory is applied to cases in which the plaintiff
proves that each defendant acted tortiously and that the harm suffered by
the plaintiff resulted from the conduct of one of the defendants.4 3 Alterna-
tive liability is premised upon the rationale that proven wrongdoers should
not escape liability merely because a plaintiff is unable to identify which
defendant actually caused the injury." When the burden of proof is
shifted, each defendant has the opportunity to exonerate himself by sub-
mitting proof that he could not have caused the plaintiffs injury. Shifting
the burden of proof in such situations is justified by the presumption that a
defendant would normally be in a far better position than the plaintiff to
offer evidence establishing that another defendant caused the injury.45
Traditionally, this theory has been limited to cases where all of the poten-
tial tortfeasors have been joined as defendants and where the conduct oc-
curred simultaneously and created substantially the same risk.46 These
requirements preclude the possibility that one who actually caused the
harm to the plaintiff might escape liability by not being joined as a defend-
ant in the action.47
The classic illustration of the alternative liability theory is embodied in
Summers v. Tice.48 In that case, each of the defendants had simultane-
ously and negligently shot in the direction of the plaintiff during a hunting
expedition, and each was forced to bear the burden of proving that the
shot which injured the plaintiff was not fired by him. In holding both de-
fendants jointly and severally liable, the California Supreme Court made a
policy determination that a plaintiff should not go without a remedy
merely because the defendants' tortious acts made it impossible for the
plaintiff to identify the specific party responsible for causing the harm.49
The alternative liability theory has also justified shifting the burden of
42. See Sindell v. Abbot Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d at 598, 607 P.2d at 928. 163 Cal. Rptr.
at 136.
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Note § 433(B)(3), Comment F
(1965).
44. Id.
45. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 86, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (1948).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Note § 433(B)(3), at Comment H.
47. Id The Restatement further provides that:
some modification of the rule stated may be necessary because of complications
arising from the fact that one of the actors involved is not or cannot be joined as a
defendant, or because of the effect of lapse of time, or because of substantial differ-
ences in the character of the conduct of the actors or the risks they have created.
48. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). See Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 91 (1949).
49. 33 Cal. 2d at 88, 199 P.2d at 5. The court's decision in Summers and its policy
[Vol. 30:551
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proving causation in other situations. In Ybarra v. Spangard,5° another
California case, the plaintiff suffered paralysis of his shoulder while under-
going an appendectomy. The court determined that it would be an unfair
burden to require the plaintiff, since he was unconscious on an operating
table when the injury was sustained, to identify the particular defendant
who inflicted his injury. The plaintiff was allowed to join as defendants all
those medical personnel responsible for his safety during the operation,
and to infer negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The court
then shifted the burden of proving causation and disproving negligence to
the individual defendants. Once again, the court's justification for this
shifting of the burden of proof was its determination that the plaintiff
should not go remediless merely because he could not identify the specific
cause of his injury under the circumstances created by the defendants' con-
duct.
52
Furthermore, alternative liability may be used in situations where the
plaintiff has suffered indivisible injury through defendants' independent
tortious actions. 3 Multiple automobile collisions are a common example
of this situation, as illustrated by Eramdjian v. Interstate Bakery.54 There,
determination have been adopted by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory
Notes § 433(B)(3), Illustration 9.
Prior to Summers, courts had generally limited the imposition of joint liability to four
situations:
(1) the actors knowingly join[ed] in the performance of the tortious act or acts; (2)
the actors fail[ed] to perform a common duty owed to the plaintiff; (3) there [was] a
special relationship between the parties ... ; (4) although there [was] no concerted
action nevertheless the independent acts of several actors concur[red] to produce
indivisible harmful consequences.
1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.1, at 697-98 (1956).
50. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). See Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability,
25 CAL. L. REV. 413, 428 (1937).
51. 25 Cal. 2d at 489, 154 P.2d at 689. In Ybarra, the court stated that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur has three conditions:
(1) the accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within
the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any volun-
tary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 47, at 295 (4th ed. 1971).
Since the Ybarra decision, the doctrine has been modified by various courts. The require-
ment of "exclusive control" has been given broad judicial interpretation by some courts,
while the condition of no voluntary action on the part of the plaintiff has been eliminated in
California. The California courts have also added a requirement of probable superior
knowledge of the defendant as to the cause of the accident in certain cases. See McCoid,
Negligence Actions Against Multiple Defendants, 7 STAN. L. REV. 480, 482-85 (1955).
52. 25 Cal. 2d at 489, 154 P.2d at 689.
53. W. PROSSER, supra note 51, § 52 at 315-17.
54. 153 Cal. App. 2d 590, 315 P.2d 19 (1957).
19811
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the plaintiff was involved in a motorcycle accident, and as he was lying
unconscious on the street was subsequently run over and crushed by a
truck. The California Court of Appeals held that each defendant must
bear the burden of establishing that his acts did not cause the plaintiffs
injuries. The court concluded that the wrongdoer should bear the burden
of explaining circumstances where he would otherwise escape liability.1
5
As these cases illustrate, the alternative liability theory provides a plaintiff
with the means to present a valid cause of action when the defendants'
negligence is clear but when there is doubt as to the issue of causation.
B. Concert ofAction
The second theory under which causation may be proved in situations
where the identity of the injury-causing defendant is uncertain is concert
of action.56 This theory is applied where a plaintiff seeks to recover dam-
ages for injuries caused by a defendant who, by express or tacit agreement,
encouraged, cooperated, or actively participated in a common plan or de-
sign to commit a tortious act.57 The plaintiff may elect to sue one, all, or
any combination of participants, each being jointly and severably liable
for plaintiffs injuries. Imposition of joint liability is justified by the court's
determination that the causative tortious event was the concerted action in
which each of the defendants participated, rather than the actual infliction
of injury to the plaintiff.5"
The most common illustration of concerted action is an illegal drag race
where each participant is held liable for any injuries sustained by an inno-
cent bystander, whether or not the particular defendant in fact injured the
plaintiff. In Bierczynski v. Rogers," for example, two drivers were partici-
pating in such a race when one of their automobiles struck an oncoming
55. 153 Cal. App. 2d at 315 P.2d at 29.
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 876 (1977) provides:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is
subject to liability if he
a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design
with him, or
b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substan-
tial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or
c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and
his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third
person.
57. W. PRoSsER supra note 51, § 46, at 292.
58. The imposition of joint liability may also be justified under the theory that where
there is a joint enterprise, all the actors are vicariously liable for the negligent acts of each
other. W. PROSSER, supra note 51, § 46, at 291. See note 61 and accompanying text infra.
59. 239 A.2d 218 (Del. 1968).
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automobile driven by the plaintiff. The court held that regardless of which
defendant's automobile actually collided with the plaintiffs, participation
in an illegal drag race proved negligence and therefore both participants
were liable for injuries sustained by an innocent third person.6" Similarly,
in Sprinkle v. Lemley,61 the concert of action theory was applied to hold
two physicians liable, each for the negligence of the other. The two physi-
cians were held liable for plaintiffs ischemic contracture which resulted
from the treatment of a fractured leg. The court noted that the concert of
action theory was applied correctly because the acts of one physician were
not independent of the other when both physicians treated the patient in
concert.62
To establish concert of action, the conduct of the defendants must be
shown to constitute an agreement to participate in the commission of a
tortious act; mere knowledge by one defendant of another defendant's ac-
tions is insufficient. Moreover, each defendant must intend to act in fur-
therance of the tortious act.63 Thus, in Duke v. Feldman,64 the fact that a
wife watched her husband assault a third person and subsequently drove
him away from the scene was insufficient to impose liability on the wife in
an action for civil assault. Absent evidence that she assisted her husband
or encouraged the assault, the wife could not be considered a participant in
a design to perpetuate the tortious action.65
The rationale underlying the concert of action theory is probably more
the deterrence of hazardous group behavior than the solution of the prob-
lem of identifying the actual injury-producing party.66 Nevertheless, the
theory effectively obviates the need to identify the actual defendant who
caused a plaintiff's injury by holding each defendant liable for substantial
encouragement of a tortious act.
C. The Theory of Industry- Wide Liability
The theory of industry-wide liability is the most recent exception to the
general requirement that a plaintiff must identify the actual party causing
his injury in order to present a valid cause of action.67 This theory was
60. Id. at 221.
61. 243 Or. 521, 414 P.2d 797 (1966).
62. Id. at 524, 414 P.2d at 800-01.
63. W. PROSSER, supra note 51, § 46, at 292.
64. 245 Md. 454, 226 A.2d 345 (1967).
65. Id. at 457-59, 226 A.2d at 347-48.
66. Comment, supra note 5, at 979.
67. This theory has also been termed "enterprise liability." However, enterprise liability
should be confined to describing the application of risk distribution theory which states that
losses to society created by an enterprise should be borne by that enterprise to further the
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suggested in Hall v. El Du Pont De Nemours & Co. ,68 where the court
held that there are certain circumstances in which an entire industry may
be liable for harm caused by its operations.69
The Hall case, commonly known as the "blasting cap case," arose when
the parents of children injured by exploding dynamite blasting caps sought
to recover from the manufacturers. The individual blasting caps were
neither labeled nor marked with any warning of the potential danger, and
the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, six manufacturers and their trade
association, consciously agreed to establish an industry-wide practice of
omitting such warnings. This practice, together with the failure of the de-
fendants to take other safety precautions, allegedly created an unreasona-
ble risk of harm which resulted in injuries to their children.7" The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York reasoned that
under such limited circumstances, industry-wide liability may be imposed.
The court stressed that the evidence established that the defendants had
jointly controlled the risk through their adherence to an industry-wide
standard of safety, and that some functions of safety, including labeling,
had been delegated to their trade association. 7 Furthermore, although all
historical goals of resource conservation and fair distribution of the cost of accidents. See
Klemme, The Enterprise Liability of Torts, 47 COLO. L. REV. 153, 158 (1976).
68. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). This case consisted of two consolidated causes of
action. Chance v. EL Du Pont De Nemours & Co. involved 12 unrelated blasting cap acci-
dents in 10 states between 1955 and 1959, allegedly injuring 13 children. The manufacturer
who actually produced the injury-causing caps was unknown. The plaintiffs joined as de-
fendants six manufacturers and their trade association. In Hall v. El Du Pont De Nemours
& Co., the original complaint involved 43 plaintiffs and 230 claims against 15 defendants,
including the manufacturers and their trade association. An antitrust complaint was dis-
missed, 312 F. Supp. 358 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), and the amended complaint was based on tort
theory. The plaintiffs were three families with injured children, residing in three states; the
defendants were two manufacturers allegedly responsible for manufacturing the blasting
caps which injured the children. Subsequently, the plaintiffs' claims were severed and trans-
ferred to the federal district court sitting in the district where the accident occured. Chance
v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 371 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). Thus, the theory
espoused in Hall is merely "suggested" because the court decision was confined to its ruling
on the motions of defendants for dismissal, severance, and transfer. 26 Cal. 3d at 608 n.22,
607 P.2d at 934 n.22, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 142 n.22.
69. 345 F. Supp. at 358.
70. Id at 359. The relevant part of the court's decision on industry-wide liability oc-
curred in its discussion of the facts in Chance. The plaintiffs in Chance proceeded on a
concert of action theory. However, this theory needed to be modified to the facts due to
plaintiffs failure to offer evidence of an "agreement" essential to concert of action. See note
63 and accompanying text supra.
71. The court stated that joint control of the risk could be established by (1) the exist-
ence of an explicit agreement; or (2) evidence of parallel behavior sufficient to support an
inference of a tacit agreement; or (3) independent adherence to an industry-wide standard or
custom. 345 F. Supp. at 373-74.
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the defendant-manufacturers had participated in joint creation of the risk,
the specific defendant manufacturing the injury-causing blasting cap could
not be identified because the evidence was destroyed in the explosion. In
such circumstances, the court reasoned, a shifting of the burden of proof of
causation could be justified.72
The theory of industry-wide liability combines elements of classic con-
certed action and alternative liability for use in situations where neither
theory would be applicable by itself.73 The concept of "joint control of the
risk" by the defendants in industry-wide liability evolves from the required
"agreement" between the defendants in concert of action cases. Under
both theories, each defendant's participation in the tortious event may be
regarded as the cause-in-fact of the plaintiffs injury. Liability is imposed
on each defendant to deter hazardous group behavior in the future. Joint
control of the risk, however, may be proved by evidence of an independent
adherence to an industry-wide standard or custom, although such adher-
ence is insufficient to constitute a tacit agreement under the concert of ac-
tion.74 This evidence is sufficient to shift the burden of proving causation
to the defendants,7" so that, as in alternative liability, a guilty rather than
an innocent party would bear the loss from the failure to meet the burden
of proof.
76
The theory of industry-wide liability is consistent with the general policy
considerations of products liability law: namely, to compensate for inju-
ries caused by the use of a defective product and to discourage manufac-
turers from producing unsafe products.77  Furthermore, industry-wide
liability promotes the theory that losses to society caused by such activity
should be internalized by the responsible party to further the social poli-
cies of conservation of resources and fair distribution of the cost of acci-
dents among society's members.
III. SINDELL v ABBOTT INDUSTRIES: THE NEED FOR A NEW
THEORY OF LIABILITY.
In 1976, Judith Sindell initiated a class action in a California trial court
72. Id at 378-80. Before the burden of proof could be shifted to defendants, the court
required plaintiffs to establish "by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury-causing
caps were the product of some unknown one of the named defendants, that each named
defendant breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiffs, and that these breaches were sub-
stantially concurrent in time and of a similiar nature." Id at 380.
73. See Comment, supra note 5, at 995-1000.
74. 345 F. Supp. at 374.
75. Id
76. Id at 379.
77. See Note, Industry-wide Liability, 13 SUFFOLK L. REV. 980, 996 (1979).
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for personal injuries resulting from her mother's ingestion of DES during
pregnancy. 78 The plaintiff filed her complaint against eleven drug manu-
facturing companies,79 and sought to recoVer general damages in the
amount of $1,000,000 and punitive damages in the amount of
$10,000,000.8 0 She also sought equitable relief in the form of an order
compelling defendants to inform the public of the risks inherent in DES
exposure and to establish appropriate clinics for treatment of DES daugh-
ters.8 '
The plaintiff proceeded under eight causes of action,82 each alleging that
the manufacturers were jointly liable because they had acted in concert
and in reliance upon each other's testing and marketing methods to exploit
the drug. Since the plaintiff could not identify the manufacturer of the
injury-causing drug, the complaint suggested that liability be based on al-
ternative liability, concert of action, or industry-wide liability.
83
In a well-reasoned and thorough opinion, 4 the California Supreme
Court did not apply these theories to the facts of the Sindell case.85 The
court, however, declined to bar the plaintiff from recovery and proceeded
78.' Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 13, at 1. The complaint was filed on Au-
gust 2, 1976, and on October 22, 1976, defendant Abbott Laboratories demurred to the com-
plaint. The plaintiff did not appear in opposition to the demurrer and it was sustained on
November 8, 1976. Judge Hupp, of the California Court of Appeals, stated that there was
"[n]o allegation that any product manufactured by demurring Defendant caused any harm
to the Plaintiff." Id The plaintiff failed to amend her complaint within 30 days to allege
that Abbott Laboratories had manufactured the DES ingested by her mother. The plaintiffs
complaint was then dismissed by Judge Pacht on January 14, 1977. Notice of Appeal of the
judgment was filed by the plaintiff on January 31, 1977. Similar demurrers were brought by
the other defendants and granted. The plaintiff filed Notice of Appeal from the judgments.
Id at 2-3.
79. See note 13 supra.
80. Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 13, at 1.
81. 26 Cal. 3d at 595, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
82. Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 13, at 3.
The Complaint sets forth eight causes of action, namely negligence, strict liability
in tort, lack of consent, breach of warranty, breach of implied warranty, fraud,
violation of Federal law (misbranding), and conspiracy. Each cause of action
arises out of the manufacture and/or sale of DES products by the Defendants; the
promotion of those products as a safe drug among one of whose purposes was the
prevention of miscarriage in pregnant women when the Defendants knew or
should have known that the drug caused cancer in certain test animals and was
likely to cause cancer in the women who took the drug or their offspring.
Id at 3-4.
83. 26 Cal. 3d at 595-97, 607 P.2d at 926-27, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134-35.
84. Associate Judge Stanley Mosk, who wrote the majority opinion in Sindell, was re-
cently selected as outstanding appellate judge by the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America. TRIAL, Sept., 1980, at 11.
85. 26 Cal. 3d at 598, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
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to enunciate a novel theory under which Ms. Sindell could proceed with
her cause of action. This theory, based upon each manufacturer's market
share of the defective product, will be referred to as "market share liabil-
ity."
In Sindell, the plaintiff first claimed to have a valid cause of action
under the doctrine of alternative liability. 6 Essentially, the plaintiff
averred that the manufacturers had acted tortiously in marketing, manu-
facturing, and promoting DES, and that this conduct had resulted in injury
to the daughters of women who had ingested the drug. Additionally, she
argued that had the manufacturers provided adequate warnings to those
who ingested the drug, documentation would have existed which, in the
case of potential injury resulting from the use of the drug, would have
eliminated the uncertainty in identifying the specific manufacturer. Under
these circumstances, the plaintiff maintained that the burden of proof
should shift from the innocent plaintiff to the negligent defendants. This
shift would require the defendants to exonerate themselves by presenting
evidence establishing that they could not have manufactured the specific
drug ingested by the plaintiffs mother.8 7
The plaintiff sought to analogize her case to Summers v. Tice.8 In both
cases, the defendants committed negligent acts, the plaintiffs were inno-
cent, and the fungible nature of the injury-causing substance made it im-
possible for the plaintiff to identify which of the negligent defendants had
caused the actual damage.8 9 Since the plaintiff argued that the manufac-
turers' negligence in failing to provide warnings on the drug's label di-
rectly created the identification problem,9" she contended that application
of the theory of alternative liability was even more appropriate here than
in the Summers case, where the identity problem was due to the defend-
ants' simultaneous shooting, not itself tortious conduct.
86. Additional Brief for Appellant, at 10, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588,
607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980), at 10 [hereinafter cited as Additional Brief for
Appellant].
87. Id at 11-13.
88. See notes 48-49 and accompanying text supra.
89. In Summers, the negligent act on the part of the defendants was shooting in the
direction of the plaintiff without due care. The product which caused the injury was a shot-
gun pellet. Each of the defendants' guns was loaded with identical pellets. 33 Cal. 2d at 81,
199 P.2d at 2.
In Sindell, the plaintiff alleged that defendants' negligent act was the marketing, manufac-
turing, and promoting of DES without adequate testing. This product was manufactured
under a common formula established by the United States Pharmacopeia. 26 Cal. 3d at 605,
607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
90. Additional Brief for Appellant, supra note 86, at 12-13.
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The plaintiff also compared her case to Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel,9
where the plaintiff was uncertain as to the cause of the drowning of his son
in the defendant's hotel pool. The Haft court ruled that the lack of evi-
dence of causation was due to defendant's failure to provide a lifeguard as
required by law.92 The court then shifted to the defendant the burden of
proving causation-that its action was not the cause of the boy's death. In
so doing, the court stated that the absence of definite evidence on the issue
of causation was a direct and foreseeable result of the defendants' negli-
gence, and that, under the circumstances, the defendant should bear the
burden of proof.93 Ms. Sindell asserted that her case presented a similar
situation since the defendants' negligence in not properly labeling the drug
as experimental, and in failing to discover or warn of the dangers of DES,
had resulted in the plaintiffs mother's failure to keep adequate records or
to remember the identity of the manufacturer which had supplied the
DES.
94
Ms. Sindell also addressed economic considerations, contending that the
defendants realized cost savings and increased sales through their im-
proper labeling and manufacturing of DES. 95 Accordingly, the plaintiff
argued that, as a matter of policy, all customers of the drug companies
rather than one particular user of DES should bear the burden of loss
resulting from these economies. In presenting this argument, the plaintiff
again relied on Haft, in which the court had stated that the burden of the
loss should be borne by the entire group benefiting from the cost savings
realized by not employing a lifeguard rather than by one particular
guest.96
After arguing initially that an appropriate situation existed for applica-
tion of alternative liability, the plaintiff confronted the substantive
problems associated with the theory's use. First, she asserted that the bur-
den of proof should shift to the defendants regardless of their lack of
knowledge on the subject of causation.97 According to the plaintiff, the
issue was not whether the defendants had knowledge of the cause of the
91. 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970).
92. 3 Cal. 3d at 763 n.3, 478 P.2d at 468 n.3, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 748 n.3. The statute
provided hotel owners with the alternative of posting a warning as to the assumption of risk
by swimming without a lifeguard.
93. Id. at 773-75, 478 P.2d at 476-77, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 756-57.
94. Additional Brief for Appellant, supra note 86, at 17-18.
95. Id at 20.
96. 63 Cal. 3d at 776, n.20, 478 P.2d at 477 n.20, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 757 n.20. This state-
ment by the court in Haft illustrates the developing policy of risk distribution in tort law.
See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
97. Additional Brief for Appellant, supra note 86, at 25-26.
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injury but whether the plaintiffs inability to identify the defendant respon-
sible for her injury was due to the defendant's conduct in marketing the
drug. Second, the plaintiff contended that the alternative liability theory
did not require all potential defendants to be before the court, for if a
defendant could exonerate himself as a causative factor, he could do so
regardless of the number of defendants joined in the action.98 Moreover,
the plaintiff asserted that liability under the theory was joint and several
and that the plaintiff could select the party or parties against whom to
execute the judgment.99 Accordingly, an individual defendant's potential
liability would be arguably the same regardless of the number of code-
fendants in the action.
Finally, the plaintiff argued that even if Summers required all potential
defendants to be before the court, the modification of the equitable idem-
nity rule by the California Supreme Court in American Motorcycle Associa-
tion v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County""° rendered this prerequisite
unnecessary. After American Motorcycle, the defendants named in the suit
could join all other appropriate defendants, thereby gaining the opportu-
nity to recover from their codefendants, according to their percentage of
negligence. 10 Consequently, she argued that defendants' ability to seek
indemnity from other jointly liable defendants strengthened her conten-
tion that she should not have to bear the undue burden of naming more
than a small number of defendants.'° 2
The California Supreme Court declined to accept the alternative liabil-
ity theory presented by the plaintiff. The court first addressed the defend-
98. Id. at 22. In support of this argument, the plaintiff cited Moore v. Foster, 182 Miss.
15, 180 So. 73 (1938), where the court held that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to join
both constables who shot at the plaintiff in an action for damages for wrongful and negligent
shooting of the plaintiff. The plaintiff also cited Oliver v. Miles, 144 Miss. 852, 110 So. 666
(1926), in which the court held that the plaintiff could recover against either negligent de-
fendant although it was impossible to tell with certainty who actually inflicted the injury.
Finally, plaintiff cited Benson v. Ross, 143 Mich. 452, 106 N.W. 1120 (1906), where the court
held that the plaintiff could proceed against two of the three negligent defendants who could
have fired the bullet which had injured him.
99. Additional Brief for Appellant, supra note 86, at 25-26.
100. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978). In that case, the court
decided that the adoption of the comparative negligence rule did not warrant the abolition
of joint and several liability and that a comparative negligence defendant was authorized to
file a cross-complaint against any person, whether already a party to the action or not, from
whom the named defendant sought to obtain total or partial indemnity.
101. Additional Brief for Appellant, supra note 86, at 25-26.
102. Id at 29. The court of appeals below held that the plaintiff could survive a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action through the application of the alternative
liability theory. That court, citing American Motorcycle, also held that the defendant could
possibly bring in other DES manufacturers as cross-defendants. Sindell v. Abbott Laborato-
ries, 149 Cal. Rptr. 138, 150 (Ct. App. 1978).
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ants' contention that the theory could not be applied because the
manufacturers were not in a better position to offer evidence to determine
which one caused the injury.' 3 However, the court correctly pointed out
that the factual circumstances of the Summers case itself precluded an ex-
planation of the cause of the plaintiffs injury. "o Thus, although defend-
ants are ordinarily in a better position to offer evidence of causation,
application of the alternative liability theory is not foreclosed when they
cannot offer such evidence.'0 5
The court did find, however, that the alternative liability theory as previ-
ously applied could not be the basis for liability in this case. According to
Judge Mosk, in applying the traditional theory of causation, the possibility
that one of the five defendants joined in the action was actually the sup-
plier of the DES given to the plaintiffs mother was too remote. 0 6 In sup-
port of this conclusion, the court noted that the theory had previously been
limited to situations in which all potentially guilty parties were before the
court. Without this limitation, the offending party might not be named
and therefore could escape liability altogether. Thus, the court concluded
that in the Sindell case, where any one of 200 companies could have pro-
duced the particular drug ingested by the plaintiffs mother, only five of
whom were before the court, application of the alternative liability theory
was precluded.
10 7
The plaintiff next contended that she could recover under the concert of
action theory,'0 " alleging that her injury was caused by a tacit understand-
ing among the defendants to act in concert to market, manufacture, and
promote DES as a miscarriage preventative.'0 9 The plaintiff relied on
Orser v. George "° in asserting that under the concert of action theory, her
claim was valid even though the possibility existed that none of the named
defendants had manufactured the DES actually ingested by her mother.
In Orser, a wrongful death action, decedent was killed by a pistol fired by
103. 33 Cal. 2d at 83, 199 P.2d at 4.
104. 26 Cal. 3d at 601, 607 P.2d at 929, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
105. The court also distinguished Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465,
91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970), because in the present case, the difficulty of identifying the cause of
the injury resulted from the passage of time rather than the negligence of the defendants.
The court rejected the plaintiffs contention that, had her mother been warned of the risks
associated with taking DES to prevent miscarriages, she would have kept more complete
records to indicate which drug had caused the plaintiffs injuries. 26 Cal. 3d at 602, 607 P.2d
at 930, 163 Cal. Rptr at 138.
106. 26 Cal. 3d at 604, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
107. Id.
108. Additional Brief for Appellant, supra note 86, at 35.
109. Id.
110. 252 Cal. App. 2d 660, 60 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1967).
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one of defendant's two companions. The court reversed a summary judg-
ment and held that the rifle-carrying defendant could be found liable for
the decedent's injuries on a concert of action theory. There was evidence
in the record that defendant possibly knew that his companions' conduct
breached a duty of care owed to the decedent, and that the defendant sub-
stantially assisted or encouraged such tortious conduct."'
The Sindell plaintiff argued that as in Orser, no one defendant could be
shown to have been the actual cause of the plaintiffs injury; nevertheless,
each could be found to have substantially encouraged the tortious conduct
of the others."' Emphasizing that there existed a common and mutually
agreed upon formula for DES, that the drug was marketed by each de-
fendant as a safe and effective product, and that each defendant knew of
its generic nature, the plaintiff contended that these facts were sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of Orser to proceed under the concert of action
theory.
1 13
The court found the facts before it inappropriate for application of the
concert of action theory. It rejected plaintiff's argument that the conduct
of the defendants, collaborating in and relying upon each other's inade-
quate testing and marketing methods and failing to give warnings concern-
ing the hazards of DES, constituted a tacit understanding among the
defendants to commit a tortious act against the plaintiff." 4 The court
noted that DES was produced from a common and mutually agreed upon
formula in compliance with the requirements set forth in the United States
Pharmacopoeia".5 and not as a concerted tortious action." 6 The court
found further that parallel testing and marketing techniques were charac-
teristic of the drug industry and that a decision rendering such conduct
concerted action would be an unjust expansion of the theory.' '7 The court
distinguished the cases cited by the plaintiff by noting that they involved
situations where only one plaintiff was injured; the tortious conduct was by
111. 60 Cal. Rptr. at 716-17.
112. Additional Brief for Appellant, supra note 86, at 38.
113. The court of appeals stated that the allegations of the plaintiff satisfied the pleading
requirement necessary to hold the defendants liable on a concert of action theory. 149 Cal.
Rptr. at 145.
114. 26 Cal. 3d at 605, 607 P.2d at 932, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
115. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 351(b) (1976).
116. 26 Cal. 3d at 605, 607 P.2d at 932-33, 163 Cal. Rptr at 140-41.
117. Id at 605, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141. Specifically, the court stated that:
[aipplication of the concept of concert of action to this situation would expand the
doctrine far beyond its intended scope and would render virtually any manufac-
turer liable for the defective products of an entire industry, even if it could be
demonstrated that the product which caused the injury was not made by the de-
fendant.
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a small number of individuals over a short span of time; and each defend-
ant either directly participated in or encouraged and assisted in the act
causing the injury. " 8 In Sindell, however, millions of women were alleg-
edly injured; the tortious conduct occurred over a quarter of a century and
involved approximately 200 individual drug manufacturers; and there was
no evidence that each defendant directly participated in or encouraged and
assisted a concerted tortious act.
The plaintiffs final argument alleged that a valid claim existed under
the industry-wide theory of joint liability. "9 The plaintiff asserted that
there was a considerable risk involved in manufacturing and marketing
DES, and that this risk was jointly controlled by the drug manufacturers.
Specifically, the plaintiff stated that all DES manufacturers knew of the
risk involved in distributing an experimental drug and that the manufac-
turers tacitly agreed to omit the required FDA warning labels on DES
packages. She also asserted that the entire drug industry adhered to an
inadequate standard for testing the drug. Furthermore, she contended that
the DES manufacturers' method of promotion encouraged pregnant wo-
men, physicians, and pharmacists to rely on the generic nature of the drug
and to prescribe it interchangeably. The plaintiff concluded that each man-
ufacturer had benefited from exploitation of the drug by all other manu-
facturers and that sales of DES had been boosted throughout the
industry. 120 In presenting this final argument, the plaintiff relied on Hall v.
El Du Pont De Nemours & Co. 121 Essentially, the plaintiff claimed that
the facts evidenced parallel behavior among the drug manufacturers and
an inference of tacit cooperation as well as independent adherence to a
tortious industry-wide standard of behavior. 22 The plaintiff concluded
that this joint control of the risk should shift the burden of proving causa-
tion to the defendant manufacturers.
123
118. Id. The plaintiff relied on the following cases: Loeb v. Kimmerle, 215 Cal. 143, 9
P.2d 199 (1932) (defendant held jointly liable for plaintiff's injuries when he encouraged
another to commit an assault); Weinberg Co. v. Bixby, 185 Cal. 87, 196 P. 25 (1921) (hus-
band held liable with his wife for wrongful diversion of flood waters); Orser v. Vierra, 252
Cal. App. 2d 660, 60 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1967) (rifle-carrying defendant may be jointly liable for
death caused by bullet from one of two codefendants' pistols); Agovino v. Kunze, 181 Cal.
App. 2d 591, 5 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1960) (participant in a drag race was held liable for injuries to
a plaintiff who collided with the car of another racer); Meyer v. Thomas, 18 Cal. App. 2d
299, 63 P.2d 1176 (1936) (two defendants held liable for participation in the conversion of a
note and deed of trust).
119. Additional Brief for Appellant, supra note 86, at 38-39.
120. Id at 41-43.
121. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
122. Additional Brief for Appellants, supra note 86, at 41.
123. Id. at 43.
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The theory of industry-wide liability, termed by the court a "novel ap-
proach to the problem,"' 24 was similarly rejected for a variety of reasons.
As interpreted by the court, this theory of liability would be applied when
each manufacturer in a particular industry adheres to a standard found to
be negligent by a court and also found to be the cause of the plaintiffs
injuries. The Sindell court emphasized that the number of producers in
the industry and the degree of joint control of the risk are important fac-
tors in deciding whether to apply this theory. Thus, in Sindell, where no
allegations existed that safety functions had been delegated to a trade asso-
ciation and where the industry was decentralized, the application of the
industry-wide theory of liability would be unreasonable. 2 Furthermore,
the drug industry itself is regulated by the FDA and the industry standards
are defined by the FDA standards to a considerable degree. The court
concluded that it would be unfair to impose liability on a manufacturer
who did not supply the injury-producing drug because it followed the ac-
cepted drug industry standards.1
26
IV. THE SINDELL SOLUTION: THE THEORY OF MARKET SHARE
LIABILITY
Having rejected the three prongs of Ms. Sindell's argument, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court nevertheless stated that it would be unfair to allow her
to go without a remedy. It began its formulation of a theory on which the
plaintiff could proceed by noting that the policy considerations argued by
the plaintiff, together with the court's view that legal theories should adapt
to changes in society, justified the court's formulation of a novel ap-
proach. 1
27
The court first recognized that, in contemporary industrial society, there
is an ever increasing number of fungible goods available to the consumer.
Use of these fungible goods, which often cannot be traced to a specific
manufacturer, can leave an injured consumer remediless because identifi-
cation is impossible and current tort theories cannot be applied. As the
court noted, the response by the judicial system to this gap in tort liability
can be either to deny recovery or to respond to the changing circumstances
by fashioning new theories of recovery through the adaptation of the rules
124. 26 Cal. 3d at 598, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
125. Id at 608, 607 P.2d at 934, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 1. The court noted that the Hall
decision stressed that the application of the theory of industry-wide liability should be lim-
ited to industries involving a small number of producers where it is feasible that all the
producers had the joint capacity to reduce or affect those risks. 345 F. Supp. at 378.
126. 26 Cal. 3d at 609-10, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
127. Id. at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
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of causation and liability. The court chose the latter alternative and pro-
ceeded to modify the alternative liability theory to encompass the situation
where the fungible nature of the injury-producing product rendered identi-
fication of the manufacturer impossible.' 28
Initially, the court needed to develop a method to decrease the likeli-
hood that the manufacturer actually responsible for the injury would es-
cape liability. It noted that the great probability of the responsible party
escaping liability, when only five of a possible 200 defendants were joined
in the action, rendered shifting the burden of proof according to the alter-
native liability doctrine as previously applied impossible.' 29 The court de-
termined, however, that rather than approaching the issue of causation in
the traditional manner of measuring the possibility of a particular defend-
ant causing the injury by the number of possible defendants, it would
measure the likelihood that one specific defendant supplied the injury-pro-
ducing drug according to the market share of the particular manufacturer.
Thus, by the plaintiffs joining the manufacturers with the largest percent-
age of the market, the probability that the guilty manufacturer would es-
cape liability was significantly decreased. The problem of proving
causation was satisfied by becoming a probability rather than a remote
possibility. The court noted that this theory could be applied where the
plaintiff had joined manufacturers that, in the aggregate, represented a
substantial share of the market.'
30
The court then used the market share concept to formulate the extent of
liability for which each manufacturer would be responsible. In holding
that each defendant would be liable for the proportion of the judgment
represented by its share of the market, the court stated that this approach,
although not immune from minor discrepancies in the correlation between
market share and liability, would render each manufacturer's liability an
approximation of its responsibility for the injuries caused by its own pro-
duction of the drug.
131
The market share liability theory developed by the Sindell court was
founded upon the policy determination that "as between an innocent
plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the cost of in-
jury.""'32 The court found that, under the circumstances of the case,
neither the plaintiff nor the defendants could be attributed with the failure
128. Id
129. Id at 611, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. See notes 42-47 and accompa-
nying text supra.
130. 26 Cal. 3d at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
131. Id at 612-13, 607 P.2d at 937-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
132. Id at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. As noted by the court, this was the
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of providing evidence as to which DES manufacturer actually caused the
plaintiffs injuries. The court stated, however, that the conduct of the drug
manufacturers in marketing DES "played a significant role in creating the
unavailability of proof."' 3 3 Furthermore, the court asserted that the phar-
maceutical industry, through insurance and risk distribution, was better
able to absorb the cost of injuries suffered by the plaintiff. The imposition
of liability on manufacturers in this case would encourage vigilance in de-
tecting and publicizing the harmful effects of a product. It would also pro-
vide compensation for injuries suffered by an unaware and "virtually
helpless"' 34 consumer. The court concluded that these factors, along with
the important policy considerations of products liability law,' 35 were deter-
minative in their decision to create a new theory of liability upon which
the plaintiff could present a valid cause of action.
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET SHARE LIABILITY THEORY
On October 14, 1980, the Supreme Court of the United States denied a
petition for a writ of certiorari to review the California Supreme Court's
decision in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories. 36 In filing this petition, the
pharmaceutical companies termed the imposition of market share liability
as "wholly arbitrary and irrational"' 37 and contended that destructive lia-
bility and anticompetitive consequences would result from the imposition
of this theory.'38 Another critic referred to the decision in Sindell as being
"one step further towards the dawn of the age of 'absolute' products liabil-
ity." ' "9 The criticisms of the Sindell decision, as well as the practical effect
of the imposition of market share liability, warrant examination in order to
determine the viability of market share liability as a means of closing the
gap in products liability law where the identification of the manufacturer
of the injury-causing product is virtually impossible.
The first contention raised by the pharmaceutical companies in their pe-
tition was that the Sindell decision created unworkable and irrational pro-
cedural devices which, in effect, eliminate proof of causation in violation
policy determination of Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). See notes 48-49
and accompanying text supra.
133. 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
134. Id.
135. See note 77 and accompanying text supra.
136. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr 132, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286 (1980).
137. Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari at 9, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588,
607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari].
138. Id at 8.
139. Kroll, supra note 7, at 185.
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of due process and equal protection. 4 ° Proof of causation is an essential
element in every products liability case,14 ' and it serves to prevent the im-
position of liability based on pure speculation or conjecture. Accordingly,
the pharmaceutical companies maintained that "to establish causation by
the joinder of a substantial share of a given market where identification of
the responsible party is not now possible"' 42 is unreasonable and, in actu-
ality, is a violation of due process. In support of this argument, the compa-
nies asserted several arguments as to why the decision is unreasonable. To
illustrate this assertion, the manufacturers pose the following hypothetical:
Defendants before the court might consist of Manufacturer A
with 40% of the market, Manufacturer B with 4% of the market,
and Manufacturer C with 0.4% of the market. Since even plain-
tiffs would not dispute that the statistical correlation between
DES exposure and clear cell adenocarcinoma does not exceed 1.4
per 1,000, there is no way to determine whether sales by the 4% or
0.4% market share defendants might have resulted in any injuries
whatsoever. A's presence does not in any way increase the likeli-
hood that either B or C was the responsible manufacturer.
143
The manufacturers assert that a particular defendant's liability will al-
most always exceed its market share because, although only 44.4% of the
market is joined in the hypothetical, the defendants are jointly and sever-
ally liable for 100% of the injuries sustained by the plaintiffs. However, the
manufacturers failed to point out that they are afforded the opportunity to
join the other pharmaceutical companies, not joined in the action, which
may have supplied the DES actually ingested by the plaintiff's mother.'
Accordingly, if a particular defendant does not wish to absorb the market
shares of nonparty DES manufacturers, it may proceed against such man-
ufacturers by way of third party complaint for contribution in accordance
with their respective market share. Thus, although Manufacturers A, B,
and C may be held liable for more than twice their market shares,145 they
need not bear this total amount unless they forgo the procedural devices
available to them.
Second, the manufacturers contended that once a defendant exculpates
itself from liability or a plaintiff succeeds in identifying the manufacturer
responsible for her injuries, the defendants would bear disproportionate
140. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, supra note 137, at 9, 17.
141. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
142. Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari, supra note 137, at 10-11.
143. Id at 12.
144. Cf. notes 105-07 and accompanying text supra (alternative liability precluded if all
potentially liable parties not joined).
145. Petioner's Brief for Certiorari, supra note 137, at 13.
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measures of liability.'46 The manufacturers stated that a particular de-
fendant may be found responsible for the entire amount of one plaintiffs
injuries upon proof of causation and other elements of the case, and may
still be liable for a percentage of another plaintiffs claim. The manufactur-
ers contended that these two cases together would expose a defendant to
liability greater than that of its market share.
Each plaintiffs claim, however, is a separate cause of action and each
defendant's liability is determined independently. The fact that a manu-
facturer is found to be the sole cause of a plaintiffs injury in one cause of
action should have no effect on another plaintiffs claim under the market
share liability theory. Furthermore, the manufacturers' contention that
this theory would discourage a plaintiff from offering evidence of one
manufacturer's liability is unjustified because even if such evidence did
exist, it would most likely be discoverable by the manufacturer and used to
exculpate itself from any liability.
The manufacturers next argued that the definitions of the product mar-
ket and the geographical market'47 would be construed arbitrarily by the
courts because the drug was dispensed in such a wide variety of quantities
throughout the United States.' 48 Leaving factual determination of a de-
fined market to the courts may present a problem in the application of the
market share liability theory to particular cases, but definitional problems
exist in all areas of law. For example, in the area of antitrust enforcement,
courts are called upon to define the relevant market in a particular fact
situation. The definition of the relevant market by the court may well de-
termine whether a corporation has violated antitrust regulations. As in the
application of antitrust laws, the determination of the "product market"
and the "geographical market" in DES cases will be a matter for the court
to adjudge according to the particular fact situation and evidence
presented. 49 A judicial analysis of the factors to be considered in defining
the relevant market for application of the market share liability theory will
most likely develop on a case-by-case basis.
The manufacturers also argued that the Sindell court failed to consider
adequately the fact that its decision may render the pharmaceutical com-
panies uninsurable and that many firms in the industry, especially the
smaller ones, would not be able to absorb the costs of litigation and "ran-
146. Id
147. Id at 14.
148. The drug manufacturers stated that DES was manufactured in at least 13 different
dosages, ranging from .1 mg. to 250 mg., and was indicated and sold for many purposes
other than prevention of accidents during pregnancy. Id
149. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 41-42 (1977).
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dom liability" associated with the market share liability theory. 5' These
economic considerations have been of major concern to the business and
legal communities where courts have contemplated any expansion of prod-
ucts liability law.' 5 ' Although the manufacturers may have overstated the
severity of the problem in their petition, it is clear that many pharmaceuti-
cal companies may suffer serious financial loss because of the Sindell deci-
sion.
One of the manufacturers' most persuasive arguments against the mar-
ket share liability theory is that the pharmaceutical industry will be unable
to obtain liability insurance for its products. This problem of products
liability insurance has increased in recent years, especially within the phar-
maceutical industry.' 52 The major factor contributing to the increase in
cost of liability insurance is the corresponding increase in the number and
size of successfully litigated claims by products liability plaintiffs.'53 The
drug manufacturers asserted that the market share liability theory would
render the insurer unable to determine the scope of exposure for a particu-
lar manufacturer if that manufacturer could be compelled to litigate and
compensate a plaintiff for injuries sustained by an industry product not
directly attributed to the insured manufacturer.'
5 4
Several solutions have been proposed for dealing with the problems of
products liability insurance. First, consumers may be able to absorb the
increase in the cost of liability insurance of the manufacturer through an
increase in the price of the product. 55 As for those firms that cannot in-
crease their prices because of the competitive market, there exists the op-
tion of organizing a collective insurance company to insure against
products liability claims asserted against the founding firms.' 56 Small
firms may also choose to become self-insured by establishing a reserve
fund to protect against the risks of its product.' 57 Another alternative is
for companies, especially those who manufacture products like DES which
have the potential for causing injury years after consumption, to purchase
claims-made policies rather than the standard occurrence policies for its
150. Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari, supra note 127, at 15-16.
151. See Note, supra note 77, at 1003-06.
152. Interagency Task Force on Product Liability, Final Report, reprinted in 5 L.
FRUMER & M. FREIDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 585, at 625-26 apps. (1980).
153. See Note, supra note 77, at 1003. But see L. FRUMER & M. FREIDMAN, supra note
152, at 882 app.
154. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, supra note 137, at 16.
155. Pauly, Sue Syndrome, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 4, 1977, at 61.
156. L. FRUMER & M. FREIDMAN, supra note 152, at 1186-95 apps. This alternative may
not be feasible, however, due to statutory or economic limitations.
157. Id at 1195-1200 apps.
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products.' 58 Still another alternative exists in the form of legislative action
which may limit the amount of a particular liability claim;' 59 make direct
governmental insurance available to those industries producing high-risk
or fungible products; 160 or allow a periodic payment system for compensa-
tion to a successful products liability claimant.'
6'
These economic considerations were also noted in the dissenting opinion
in Sindell.'62 Justice Richardson stated that the application of the "deep
pocket" theory of liability under these circumstances would result in two
separate rules of law which would be determined by the wealth of the de-
fendant. 63 Moreover, the dissent stressed that Sindell has the effect of
making the pharmaceutical industry "an insurer of all injuries attributable
to defective drugs of uncertain or unprovable origin" and this effect could
spread to other industries.' 64 Recent commentators have expanded on the
criticisms expressed in the dissenting opinion, contending that the Sindell
decision has created a system of 'no-fault' products liability" 65 that will
result in costly, complicated litigation in many types of products liability
suits. 166
158. Id at 870-73 apps. The standard products liability coverage is an occurrence policy
under which injuries that occur during the policy period are insured. Alternative claims-
made coverage may decrease the risk of speculation in ratemaking in that the insurance
company is liable for claims asserted during the period of policy coverage only.
159. Id. at 1090-91 app. For example, California and New Hampshire have fixed a limit
of $250,000 for noneconomic loss in medical malpractice claims. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.2
(West 1980); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C-7(II) (1977). Other limitations may be based on
the type of injury suffered by the plaintiff. Such measures may also reduce the degree of
speculation of the future liability of the insured manufacturer.
160. An analagous type of program was undertaken by the federal government during
the National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1976).
The program does not provide direct federal insurance, but does provide that causes of
action resulting from the program can be litigated under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). The Swine Flu Immunization Program was enacted after private
insurance companies failed to provide the vaccine manufacturers with adequate insurance.
See generally Baynes, Liabilityfor Vaccine Related Injuries: Public Health Considerations
and Some Reflections on the Swine Flu Experience, 21 ST. Louis U.L.J. 44 (1977).
161. See 5 L. FRUMER & M. FREIDMAN, supra note 152, at 1104-06 apps.
162. 26 Cal. 3d at 614-22, 607 P.2d 940-43, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146-51 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
163. Id at 618, 607 P.2d at 941, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
164. Id at 621-22, 607 P.2d at 942-43, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 150-51 (Richardson, J., dissent-
ing).
165. Kroll, supra note 7, at 195.
166. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1980, § I, at 13, col. 1. A Chicago drug manufac-
turer's attorney was quoted as stating that if a person walks along the beach and cuts his foot
on a bottle opener, he can prove the opener was predictably dangerous to persons walking
on the beach and then invoke the market share liability theory to sue all 100 makers of bottle
openers. Id.
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Essentially, such economic considerations are justified and should be
given careful study by judges and legislators. The capacity of defendants
to bear the loss is one factor traditionally taken into consideration, as are
effects on the development of the industry and insurance consequences. 167
However, other factors are given consideration when determining the rela-
tive ability of the parties to absorb the injury caused by a defective prod-
uct, and economic considerations alone should not be the determinative
factor when deciding whether a plaintiff may proceed with a cause of ac-
tion in a products liability case.' 68
The second prong of the manufacturers' argument in their petition for
writ of certiorari was that the court's decision in Sindell was invalid as
contrary to federal drug policies encouraging the development and growth
of the pharmaceutical industry,'6 9 and that imposition of liability under
this theory would create an undue burden on interstate commerce. 7 ° The
manufacturers asserted that the immediate effect from the imposition of
this "random, destructive liability"'' would be to discourage the develop-
ment and distribution of new drugs and result in anticompetitive trends.
They argued that smaller firms would be unable to continue manufactur-
ing generic drugs under the increased burdens of insurance and litigation
costs, and that these increased costs would erect barriers for new firms con-
sidering entering the pharmaceutical industry. 172 Essentially, the manu-
facturers stated that such discouragement of the development of new drugs
and discrimination against interstate commerce renders the Sindell deci-
sion invalid on a constitutional basis.
There is presently no concrete evidence to determine whether the market
share liability theory will result in any of the consequences asserted by the
manufacturers. An argument can be made that the drugs which are not
produced, or which are delayed in being marketed because of the expan-
167. W. PROSSER, supra note 51, at 22.
168. Prosser suggests that the social or moral guilt of the defendant's conduct, the ability
of the judicial system to shape and administer an adequate remedy, compensation of the
victim, the prevention of future wrongs, and the traditional remedies available at common
law are other factors to be taken into consideration by the courts in determining which party
should bear the loss. Id at 16-23.
169. Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari, supra note 137, at 21. The public policy of encour-
aging the development of new drugs was noted in the dissenting opinion in Sindell. 26 Cal.
3d at 619, 607 P.2d at 941-42, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 149-50 (Richardson, J., dissenting). It has
also been noted that some manufacturers may choose to forgo the introduction of new prod-
ucts because of the concern about products liability. See L. FRUMER & M. FREIDMAN,
upra note 152, at 986 app.
170. Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari, supra note 137, at 24.
171. Id at 21.
172. Id. at 23.
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sion of liability, may be those which a manufacturer suspects may be
harmful to a consumer. 73 Furthermore, those companies that cannot
compensate for injuries caused by their product should not be allowed to
manufacture and market their products. 7 4 It can also be argued that there
is an important state interest in providing adequate compensation to those
citizens injured by defective products. The Sindell decision will likely sur-
vive the constitutional challenge that it imposes an undue burden on inter-
state commerce because the sole objective of the decision is to preserve the
health and welfare of citizens and not to protect the economies of the situa-
tion. 
75
Another criticism of the Sindell decision is that it represents a radical
departure from prior tort liability theories. Justice Richardson, in his dis-
sent, asserted that "[tihe majority now expressly abandons the foregoing
traditional requirement of some causal connection between the defend-
ants' act and the plaintiffs' injury in the creation of its new modified indus-
try-wide tort."'176  Justice Richardson reached this conclusion after
analyzing the established principles of causation, stressing that there was
no proof in the instant case that the drug manufacturers were responsible
for the plaintiffs' injuries. Furthermore, he alleges that the market share
theory will result in the imposition of liability on pure conjecture, that
plaintiffs will be able to select the defendants against whom they wish to
proceed, 77 and that the majority's decision will result in "broad and omi-
nous ramifications . . . equally threatening . . . to many other areas of
business and commercial activities."178
173. See 5 L. FRUMER & M. FREIDMAN, supra note 152, at 986 app.
174. On the whole, most manufacturers do not have a problem obtaining liability insur-
ance for their products. Small firms, especially those manufacturing high-risk products,
however, may have some difficulty in obtaining adequate and affordable liability insurance.
Id. at 624, 993-94 app.
175. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), in which the Supreme Court stated
that "[wihen there is a reasonable basis for legislation to protect the social, as distinguished
from the economic, welfare of a community, it is not for this Court because of the Com-
merce Clause to deny the exercise locally of the sovereign power of Louisiana." Id at 640.
See also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), in which the Supreme
Court upheld a local ordinance forbidding the shipment of artificial milk in interstate com-
merce as a reasonable exercise of state power to protect the public health. The imposition of
market share liability was viewed as not discriminatory against drug companies in favor of
local industry. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978) in which the
Supreme Court stated that "[t]he fact that the burden of a state regulation falls on some
interstate companies does not, by itself, establish a claim of discrimination against interstate
commerce." Id at 126 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
176. 26 Cal. 3d at 615, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 197 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
177. Id
178. Id at 621, 607 P.2d at 943, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 151. (Richardson, J., dissenting).
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A careful analysis of the historical development of products liability
law, especially in California, will show that the Sindell decision is a logical
expansion of liability based on the policy determination that "as between
an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the
loss."' 7 9 In the landmark case of Summers v. Tice, 180 the practical effect of
the California court's decision to shift the burden of proof to the defend-
ants was to impose liability on each defendant. Since both defendants shot
simultaneously in the direction of the plaintiff, there was no reason to be-
lieve that either defendant could have known which bullet caused the in-
jury to the plaintiff. Similarly, the defendant hotel owners in Haft v. Lone
Palm Hotel"8' were no more capable of proving the circumstances of the
child's death than was the plaintiff. These cases are but two illustrations of
the broad judicial interpretation given to the requirement that the plaintiff
prove a reasonable connection between the negligent act of the defendant
and the injury sustained.' 82 There is no overriding policy reason why such
a broad interpretation of causation should not be applied to areas where a
product, rather than the acts of a person, has caused the injury to the
plaintiff. '83
Moreover, the extent of Sindell's applicability to other industries must
be examined. It is feasible that any industry now manufacturing fungible
goods may be subject to liability under the market share liability theory.
Such industries would most likely include those producing chemical and
other pharmaceutical products, agricultural goods, cigarettes, and asbes-
tos.' 84 The devastating effects some commentators have predicted would
be significantly lessened, however, if judicial application of the theory
were to be prudent and appropriate to the fact situation.
The market share liability theory should be applied primarily in cases
where the passage of time or some other unusual circumstance renders
impossible the identification of the manufacturer of the injury-causing
product. Since the overwhelming majority of products liability cases are
179. Id at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
180. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
181. 478 P.2d 465 (1970).
182. W. PROSSER, supra note 51, at 236.
183. See Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543
(1962). In this article, Professor Green writes that
[s]ometimes, though not often, it is thought to be a problem how much causal rela-
tion must be found between a defendant's conduct and the victim's hurt in order to
resolve the issue in the plaintiff's favor. If the evidence is sufficient to support a
reasonable inference that the defendant's conduct contributed to the hurt, or that
reasonable men may draw different inferences, nothing more is required.
Id at 555.
184. Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1980, § 1, at 13, col. 1.
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reported within two years after the date of the occurrence of the injury,'85
this limitation would allow the theory to be applied in only a small
number of cases. Moreover, it should be imperative that plaintiffs have no
feasible method of ascertaining the identity of the manufacturer, and that
this situation is in no part due to the plaintiffs calculated oversight. Suffi-
cient evidence is usually available to the vast majority of products liability
claimants to discover the identity of the manufacturer of the injury-caus-
ing product. For example, the purchasing records of a chemical substance
alleged to have caused injury may divulge the identity of one or more
manufacturers who may have supplied the area in which the plaintiff re-
sided at the time of the injury. In cases where there is some degree of
loyalty to a particular brand of product, as with cigarettes, a plaintiff
should not be allowed to forgo inquiry by the defendants as to the brand of
cigarettes the plaintiff normally consumed. Furthermore, if a reasonable
person should have known the identity of the product consumed, the
plaintiff should not be allowed to plead ignorance and proceed under the
market share liability theory.' 86
In addition, the plaintiff should be required to prove that every manu-
facturer joined in the action under this theory is at fault for marketing a
defective product. Injury alone, regardless of the severity, cannot impose
liability.' 87 Courts should not apply the market share liability theory un-
less the plaintiff proves that the joined defendants breached their duty to
market a safe product or to provide sufficient warnings as to the harmful
effects of the product.
Finally, it must also be noted that the market share liability theory as
applied in Sindell would allow the joined defendants to join other drug
manufacturers who may have produced the injury-causing drug.' 88 With-
out this procedure, plaintiffs would be able to target and litigate against
specific manufacturers, thereby allowing other potential defendants to
avoid liability. Moreover, these targeted manufacturers may subsequently
be liable for all damages awarded to plaintiffs under this theory. It is ap-
parent that unless a similiar procedural device exists in the jurisdiction,
185. L. FRUMER & M. FREIDMAN, supra note 152, at 871 app.
186. See Note, supra note 77, at 1015. The author contends that "[i]f only one plaintiff
encountered an identification problem, it is unlikely that a court would strain to circumvent
the identification requirement."
187. Id at 1014. See Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967).
In holding that the plaintiff could not recover against the cosmetic company for injuries
sustained from the use of hair products, the court stated that "[t]he cornerstone rule in prod-
ucts liability is that -proof of mere injury furnishes no rational basis for inferring that the
product was defective for its intended use." Id at 853 (footnote omitted).
188. See notes 101-03 and accompanying text supra.
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courts should forgo the application of the market share liability theory or
risk a disproportionate number of manufacturers absorbing all litigation
and liability costs.
VI. CONCLUSION
The market share liability theory as espoused in Sindell v. Abbott Labo-
ratories is a dramatic breakthrough in products liability law. As in prior
situations in which courts have expanded liability, the case presented a
unique fact situation in which traditional doctrines could not be readily
applied. The California Supreme Court responded to this situation, as it
has done in the past, by formulating a new theory of liability rather than
leaving the injured plaintiff without a remedy. The policy determination
that, as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendant, the latter
should bear the loss, has once again given rise to an expansion of liability
in products liability law.
The feasibility of implementing the market share liability theory re-
mains to be seen. Only through a case-by-case determination of the appli-
cation of the theory can its consequences be realized. Moreover, any
adverse effects produced by the application of the theory may well be offset
by the fact that many plaintiffs, once barred from recovering for injuries
sustained from defective fungible products, are now able to present valid
causes of action to proceed against manufacturers of fungible goods.
Patricia A. Meagher
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